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Immigration, political trust, andBrexit –Testing an
aversion amplification hypothesis
Dominic Abrams* and Giovanni A. Travaglino
Centre for the Study of Group Processes, School of Psychology, University of Kent,
Canterbury, UK
A few weeks prior to the EU referendum (23rd June 2016) two broadly representative
samples of the electorate were drawn in Kent (the south-east of England,N = 1,001) and
Scotland (N = 1,088) for online surveys that measured their trust in politicians, concerns
about acceptable levels of immigration, threat from immigration, European identification,
and voting intention. We tested an aversion amplification hypothesis that the impact of
immigration concerns on threat and identification would be amplified when political trust
was low. We hypothesized that the effect of aversion amplification on voting intentions
would be mediated first by perceived threat from immigration, and then by (dis)
identification with Europe. Results in both samples were consistent with this hypothesis
and suggest that voters were most likely to reject the political status quo (choose Brexit)
when concerns that immigration levels were too high were combined with a low level of
trust in politicians.
On 23rd June 2016, a referendumwas held in the United Kingdom inwhich 52% voted to
leave the European Union and 48% voted to remain. The immediate consequence was a
precipitous drop in the value of the pound, followed by a great deal of confusion and
uncertainty as the ruling Conservative Party’s leader David Cameron resigned, and a
search for a new leader commenced. This historic vote has raised a large number of
questions about the state of the United Kingdom, the rise of populism, and the idea of
nations and nationhood. It also prompted a number of speculations on what motivated
people to vote to leave the EU.
People’s voting choices do not necessarily reflect rational decision-making (Sears, Lau,
Tyler, & Allen, 1980). Although issues such as immigration may be influential (Mughan &
Paxton, 2006), the extent of their influence varies because perceptions of threat and
attitudes to minority groups are partially shaped by other contextual factors or
contemporary events (Abrams, Houston, Van de Vyver, & Vasiljevic, 2015). Political
commentators and media speculators have proposed at least two reasons for the support
attracted by the LeaveCampaign. One of these is thatmany sections of the electoratewere
primarily concerned over apparently unprecedently high uncontrolled levels of
immigration (see Ipsos MORI, 2016). This is the ‘immigration’ explanation. The other is
a failure of trust in politics. Politicians, almost by default, are vulnerable to being
mistrustedbecause their powerpositionmeans they quite often fail in terms of their ability
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to reassure the electorate they will serve the common good rather than personal interests
(see Fiske & Durante, 2014). This research tests these two explanations using two large
samples from Kent and Scotland.
The context: Key issues in the UK referendum campaigns
Immigration
In the EU referendum, an important focus of the campaigns was how to deal with an
apparently too high level of immigration. In 2010, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May,
committed to reduce net immigration to ‘tens of thousands’ per year. By 2015, the
numbers had peaked at 336,000, and by the time of the EU referendum remained at over
320,000, despite repeated government pledges to stick to the ‘tens of thousands’ target
(Eaton, 2016). However, there was considerable debate about the meaning of these
figures because the majority of immigrants were from outside the EU, and large numbers
were in the United Kingdom as students or seasonal workers. While immigration levels
created pressures on housing and services, it also contributed substantially to the UK
economy. Therefore, a key question for political commentators was how people’s
concerns about immigration would be connected to their intention to vote to leave or
remain in the EU.
Trust
A second major theme referred to a breakdown of trust in politics, leading to a revolt
against the established political elites (e.g., Mason, 2016; Stanley, 2016). Political trust is a
crucial aspect of the relationship between citizens and institutions (Hosking, 2014; Levi &
Stoker, 2000; Mishler & Rose, 2001). In general terms, political trust refers to the faith
people have in their government (Citrin & Muste, 1999). Low levels of trust imply that
individuals should devise ways to protect their own interests autonomously.
Across the United Kingdom as a whole, since 2010 there had already been evidence of
a haemorrhaging of electoral support both from traditional Conservative (right wing) and
Labour (left wing) voters towards the overtly anti-establishment UK Independence Party
(UKIP). Although Conservative supporters were more likely to vote Leave, a substantial
proportion of Labour supporters did too.
Despite the fact that the ‘first-pass-the-post’ electoral system substantially limited
UKIP’s chances of gaining seats in parliament, UKIP played a prominent role in the Leave
campaign, both by fostering mistrust against the British political establishment and by
attacking the European Union. Specifically, the Leave campaign repeatedly highlighted
that ‘unelectedbureaucrats in Brussels’were controllingUK laws andpolicies and that the
UK’s elected politicians were therefore insufficiently accountable over immigration
policy.
In the context of the EU referendum, distrust against the political establishment may
have been further increased by the apparent ambivalence towards Europe expressed by
Remain campaigners. This might have undermined confidence that the levels of
immigration would be addressed by the existing political structure.
Regional context
In the present research, we examine unique evidence from two separate population
samples of 1,000 eligible voters each fromKent and Scotland, to test the immigration and
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political trust explanations about why people voted to leave. UKIP and the Leave
campaign gained particularly strong support in some of the counties with ports facing
Europe in the south of England, especially the county ofKent. The ongoing pressure of the
‘Jungle’ (a refugee and asylum seeker camp at Calais), frequent stories that immigrants
were being illegally transported in container trucks and discovered at Folkestone and
Dover and on the arterial transport routes through Kent towards London, made the
immigration issue particularly salient (Ibrahim, 2011). In contrast, the political climate
was different in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party held all but a handful of seats
in the Scottish Parliament, and where a majority of voters favoured remaining in the EU.
Psychological research has yet to provide an empirical test of the relative support for
the immigration and trust explanations, or indeed how they combine. Political scientists
have argued strongly that it is crucial to examine the role of trust using comparative
analyses, ideallywith the samemethodology andmeasurement but fromdifferent regional
contexts (Eder, Mochmann, & Quandt, 2015). This is precisely the approach taken in the
present paper. Although we expect mean level differences on the measures between the
two samples, we regard them as conceptual replications because the psychological
processes leading to voting intentions should be consistent despite these different
contexts. Thus, to the extent that the contexts differ but the same underlying processes
are atworkwe should finddifferences inmeans but replication of the relationships among
variables in the two contexts.
The aversion amplification hypothesis
Political science has tended to treat trust primarily as a contributing independent or
mediating variable, but there is no unifying theory about its role in the political process
(see Eder et al., 2015). However, Eder et al. argue, based on Hirschman’s (1970)work on
exit, voice and loyalty, that trust should be considered as a ‘moderator variable in the
relationship between dissatisfaction and participation choices’ (p. 8) when there are
particular political issues over which uncertainty exists. Given the dearth of formal
hypotheses about such moderation, the present work drew on social psychological
perspectives to predict the likely moderating function of trust.
We contend that although the trust and concerns about immigration could each
contribute to voting intentions, they were likely to produce a catalytic effect together.
First, previous research has shown that trust may have a strong impact on the way
individuals appraise their social context. For example, research on risk management
indicates that individualswhoperceive lower trust in institutions or their government also
report amore amplified perception of risk, and are less likely to follow advice tomitigate it
(Herreros & Criado, 2009). Moreover, Arndt (2015) argues that proportional voting
opportunities (such as a referendum) in a usually majoritarian system (as in the United
Kingdom) lead to higher participation among those who have little trust or attachment to
political parties. This is because the voting system offers a route to ‘exit’ from prior
political choiceswithout having to exit from the political process as awhole, thus offering
‘voice’ to the overall society. This account may to capture the motivation of some Leave
voters in the EU referendum and underlines the important role of trust in driving people’s
voting choices.
We propose a process of aversion amplification, whereby the combination of
concerns that levels of immigration are too high and low trust in politicians may have
propelled some people to vote to leave the EU. We also expect that the psychological
vehicles for this effect are stronger perceived threat from immigrants, and identification.
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Specifically, the combination of higher concerns and lower trust seemed likely topromote
heightened perceptions of threat from immigration and thence to undermine identifica-
tion with the superordinate category, as European.
Threat from immigration
A good deal of research has examined psychological threat from immigration. According
to integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), people feel threatened by
outgroups when they believe that these groups impinge negatively on aspects of life such
as employment prospects (economic), their health and opportunities (material), and their
culture and way of life (symbolic threat). Concerns about immigration do not
automatically translate into the experience of threat. Previous research has shown that
levels of perceived threat may be activated more strongly among some individuals than
others, depending on contextual factors (Abrams & Eller, 2017; Van de Vyver, Houston,
Abrams, & Vasiljevic, 2016). In this research, we test the idea that concerns about
immigration activate threat more strongly when trust in politicians is low (i.e., aversion
amplification). We also hypothesize that higher threat will motivate people to form
stronger intentions to avoid the source of the threat. In the referendum, this would mean
leaving the EU as a means of controlling immigration.
European identity
Previous research has shown that social identity can be a proximal mediator between
perceptions of social reality (such as deprivation or injustice) and political separatism
(Grant, Bennett, & Abrams, 2017). Previous research also shows that group identification
creates a psychological anchorage that inhibits turnover among group members (Ng,
2015; Randsley de Moura, Abrams, Retter, Gunnarsdottir, & Ando, 2009). Conversely,
weaker identification with a groupmay release such constraints because the self-concept
is no longer implicated in the group membership. Therefore, we measured people’s
identification as European and predict that the less strongly people identify with the EU
the more likely they should be to vote to leave it.
Just as theremay be a range of influences on threat, a number of factorsmight influence
identification. However, we expect that identification will mediate the impact of trust,
perceptions of immigration levels, and threat on intentions to vote leave. The EU was
depicted throughout the referendum campaign as a superordinate body imposing norms
on the national subgroup, resulting in high levels of uncontrolled immigration in the
United Kingdom. It would therefore make sense that aversion amplification should
stimulate disidentification with Europe and that identification should be the most
proximal predictor of people’s intentions to vote to remain or leave.
Method
Parallel surveys were conducted in Kent and in Scotland through Qualtrics Panels. The
panels were designed to reflect a representative section of the voting age population
across areas of residence and tomatch the standard of 95%confidencewith an error rate of
<5% that is conventional for population surveys (power = .99 to detect a small effect with
alpha = .001). The surveys were completed online and participants received a small fee
(£5). The authors had no role in data collection. The surveys commenced 3 weeks prior to
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the EU referendum and closed before the referendum date. Some sections of the surveys
concerned other issues unique to the particular region. In the present analyses, we also
control for a number of potentially relevant variables including political conservatism,
age, and gender. We did not measure socio-economic status directly but had two
indicators in the form of measures of educational level and home ownership. These
measures were included to ensure that the relationships among the focal variables cannot
be explained as spurious effects due to the associations with demographic variables.
Results from the focal variables are not altered when covariates are omitted.
Procedure and measures
The surveys underwent a soft launch to check for issues such as timing and
interpretability, although none arose. In Kent (or Scotland), the research was introduced
as ‘a survey of people living in Kent (Scotland)’ focusing on views about the EU
referendum. Participants read a consent form informing them that all data would remain
anonymous and that no one other than the research team would have access to the
responses. They were asked to create a unique personal code and were informed they
could use it towithdraw their data. Tobe eligible for participation, respondents first had to
confirm that they lived in Kent (Scotland), and to identify their city, town, or village.
Participants were also asked to report their age and gender. At the end of the survey, they
were asked to indicate their highest educational qualification, andwhether they (in Kent)
or their family owned/were buying rather than renting their home.
Concerns about immigration
This was measured using a standard item from previous UK surveys (Bynner et al., 1993;
cf. Card, Dustmann, & Preston, 2005). Participants were asked to what extent they
strongly disagreed (1) or strongly agreed (5) that ‘No more foreigners wanting to live in
this country should be allowed in’. This item was intended to tap individuals’ concerns
that immigration levels in the country were too high.
Political trust
This was measured using two items based on more extended measures of political trust
(e.g., Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016): ‘Most members of UK parliament are honest’; ‘Most
members of the UK parliament can be trusted to defend the interests of the area that
elected them (their constituency) above all else’. Responseswere on a scale from Strongly
Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). Within both regions, the two trust in politicians items
were highly correlated, rKent(814) = .58, p < .001; rScotland(899) = .66, p < .001, and
were therefore averaged to form a composite score.
Threat
Three items measured participants’ sense of threat. These items were drawn from
comparable items in prior representative surveys in the United Kingdom and EU (e.g.,
Abrams &Houston, 2006; Card et al., 2005). Symbolic threat wasmeasuredwith the item
‘Immigrants are peoplewho come to settle in Britain. Howdo you think immigrants affect
the customs, traditions or general way of life of other people in Britain? Do you think they
make things worse or better?’ Realistic threat was measured with the item: ‘How do you
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think immigrants affect things like the safety, security, or health of other people in Britain?
Do you think they make things worse or better?’ Both items responded to using a scale
from much worse (1) to much better (5). Economic threat was measured using the item:
‘People who come to live in this country generally work and pay taxes at some points in
their lives. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you think that
immigrants in Britain take out more from the economy than they put in, or not?’ This item
was responded to on a scale from ‘take out a lot more than they put in’ (1), to ‘put in a lot
more than they take out’ (5). Scores on these items were reverse scored so that a higher
score represented greater threat. As the three threat items formed a reliable scale within
both regions (Cronbach’s Alpha = .91 in Kent and .88 in Scotland), the items were
averaged to provide a composite score.
European identification
Participants were asked to what extent (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) they endorsed the
statements: ‘Being European is important to me’; ‘I feel European’. The two items were
highly correlated within both regions, rKent(814) = .87, p < .001; rScotland(899) = .82,
p < .001, and were averaged to form a composite score.
Voting intention
Participants were informed: The 23rd June 2016 referendum on Europe will ask: ‘Should
the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European
Union?’ How do you intend to vote? Response options were Remain a member of the
European Union (1); Leave the European Union (2); Unsure/undecided (18); Would
not vote (19). Because this research focuses on comparing those who would vote remain
versus leave, for the purposes of most analyses the variable was recoded as 0 (remain) and
1 (leave). Participants who indicated they were unsure or would not vote responses were
excluded from the analyses.
Political orientation
To measure people’s position on a liberal-conservative continuum, given that ‘left’
corresponds to politically liberal attitudes in most western countries, participants were
instructed: Many people think of political attitudes being on the ‘left’ or ‘right’. This is a
scale stretching from the Left to the Right. When you think of your own political




We first describe the basic demographics and voting intentions of the two samples, then
conduct parallel analyses using the two different samples, examining all those who
expressed an intention to vote leave or remain (81.4% in Kent, 82.8% in Scotland). Aside
from the regional and demographic differences, we regard one sample as a conceptual
replication of the other for the purposes of testing the psychological processes.
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Sample characteristics
Kent
In the Kent sample (N = 1,001), 50% were female. The mean age was 47.2 years
(SD = 14.89). Thirty eight point one per cent indicated they would vote remain, 43.3%
would vote leave, 15.6%were unsure, and 3% said theywould not vote. Of thosewho said
theywould vote, 46.8%preferredRemain and53.2%preferred Leave (the final referendum
results were 41% Remain and 59% Leave, reflecting the acceleration of support for Leave
immediately prior to the vote). In terms of political orientation, 23.5% of the participants
described themselves towards the politically liberal (‘left’) end of the scale, 42% as neutral,
and 34.5% towards the politically conservative (‘right’) end of the scale.
Fifty-nine point one per cent had a higher education qualification, 21.9% had post 16
qualifications, and 25.3% had only basic school qualifications (up to GCSE/16-year-old
levels). 68.8% owned or were buying their home, and 27.3% were in rental accommo-
dation. Ninety-one point eight per cent of the sample described themselves as White/
White British, and the remaining participants described themselves predominantly as
mixed heritage (2.6%), Asian/Asian British (3.6%), or Black/African/Caribbean/Black
British (1.3%).
Scotland
In the Scottish sample (N = 1,088), 50.2% were female. The mean age was 48.95 years
(SD = 15.56). Fifty point seven per cent indicated they would vote remain, 32.2% would
vote leave, 15.7%were unsure, and 1.5% said theywould not vote. Of thosewho said they
would vote, 61.2%preferredRemain and 38.8%preferred Leave (the referendumvotewas
62% remain and 38% leave). Politically, 30.5% described themselves as liberal, 42.9% as
neutral, and 24.7%described themselves as conservative. Fifty-fivepoint nine per cent had
a higher education qualification, 21.8% had post 16 qualifications, and 20% had basic
school qualifications (up to GCSE/16-year-old levels). Sixty six point one per cent owned
or were buying their home, and 18.2% were in rental accommodation. Sample selection
required that all participants described themselves Scottish. Owing to an oversight
ethnicity was not measured, but demographically Scottish people in Scotland are
predominantly defined as White British (Scottish Census).
As shown in Table 1, in Kent and in Scotland, Remain voters were significantly more
likely to have a higher degree, to be younger and tended to own their home, but did not
differ in terms of gender or ethnicity (measured in Kent).
Aversion amplification hypothesis
Table 2 shows Pearson product-moment correlations among variables (point biserial
correlations in the case of binary variables). Voting intentionwas significantly related to all
measures in the expected directions consistent with the mean differences observed in
Table 1. Importantly from the point of viewof the aversion amplification hypothesis, trust
and concerns about immigration levels were not significantly related to one another in
either Kent or Scotland. Moreover, as expected, the two variables that were most highly
related to voting intention in both countries were European identification and threat.
To establish the viability of the aversion amplification hypothesis, we first conducted
simple moderation tests using SPSS PROCESS Model 1 (Hayes, 2012) with 5,000
bootstraps. Immigration level and political trust were the independent variables.
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In Kent (N = 813), the immigration concerns 9 political trust interaction term was
significant for threat (b = 0.12; SE = .02, t = 5.86, p < .001, 95% CI [0.08, 0.16]);
identification (b = 0.10; SE = .05, t = 2.13, p = .034, 95% CI [0.01, 0.19]); and vote
(b = 0.14; SE = .07, Z = 2.14, p = .032, 95% CI [0.27, 0.01]).
In Scotland (N = 899), the interaction term was significant for threat (b = 0.14;
SE = .02, t = 7.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.10, 0.17]); identification (b = 0.20; SE = .04,
t = 4.84, p < .001, 95% CI [0.12, 0.28]) but not vote (b = 0.08; SE = .06, Z = 1.27,
p = .20, 95% CI [0.20, 0.04]).
Figure 1 shows a consistent pattern across Kent and Scotland. Threat was highest,
European identification was lowest, and intention to vote leave was strongest when
people believed immigration level was too high and their political trust was low.
Indirect effects of aversion amplification
We proceeded to test the hypothesis that threat and European identification potentially
mediate the effects of aversion amplification on voting preference, using logistic binary
regression and PROCESS Model 6 (moderated serial mediation) with 10,000 Bootstraps
(seeHayes, 2015; p. 12). This enables a formal test of themediation of the interaction term
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for variables among respondents intending to vote Remain and





Mean (SD) t or v2 (df) 95% CI
Kent Immigration concerns 2.36 (1.13) 3.49 (1.25) 13.44 (811)*** 1.29, 0.96
Trust in politicians 3.02 (0.95) 2.64 (0.94) 5.71 (812)*** 0.25, 0.51
Threat 2.87 (0.79) 4.00 (0.83) 19.71 (811)*** 1.02, 1.24
Euro-identification 4.43 (1.61) 2.16 (1.56) 20.38 (812)*** 2.05, 2.49
Political orientation 3.87 (1.44) 4.47 (1.23) 6.48 (812) *** 0.79, 0.42
Age 43.88 (15.14) 50.34 (14.00) 9.27 (4) 8.47, 4.45
% Female 47.2 46.9 0.01 (1)
% higher degree 57.2 43.9 14.42 (1)***
% home ownership 76.3 70.2 3.73 (1)
% White/White British 89.3 93.1 3.56 (1)
Scotland Immigration concerns 2.41 (1.13) 3.48 (1.25) 13.25 (897) *** 1.23, 0.91
Trust in politicians 3.07 (0.91) 2.72 (0.93) 5.68 (897)*** 0.24, 0.48
Threat 2.95 (.83) 3.84 (.87) 15.36 (897)*** 78, 1.01
Euro-identification 4.33 (1.62) 2.18 (1.57) 19.71 (897) *** 1.94, 2.37
Political orientation 3.72 (1.38) 4.19 (1.26) 5.10 (897)*** 0.65, 0.29
Age 47.94 (15.90) 50.58 (14.89) 2.43 (863)* 4.77, 0.51
% Female 47.1 46.1 0.79 (1)
% higher degree 65.5 45.0 36.61 (1) ***
% family home ownership 82.5 79.5 6.58 (1)*
Notes. More positive values for each variable have the following meaning: Vote (leave); Immigration
concerns (higher); Trust (higher); Threat (higher); Identity (higher); Left–Right political orientation
(right); Gender (female); Age (older); Education (higher); Property (greater ownership). In Kent, home
ownership was own. In Scotland, home ownership was family (self or parent). T-tests are used to test for
differences for interval variables, chi-square tests for categorical variables.
***p < .001; *p < .05.
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1. Vote .43*** .20*** .57*** .58*** .22*** .01 .22*** .13*** .07
2. Immigration Concern .40*** .02 .49*** .27*** .31*** .04 .11** .12*** .10**
3. Trust in politicians .19*** .04 .31*** .24*** .19*** .13*** .07 .12*** .10**
4. Threat .46*** .50*** .33*** .60*** .19*** .07 .26*** .24*** .04
5. European Identity .55*** .28*** .31*** .50*** .14*** .01 .23*** .21*** .07*
6. Left–Right .17*** .31*** .16*** .17*** .06 .10** .06 .01 .13***
7. Gender .01 .02 .07* .05 .01 .02 .14*** .01 .02
8. Age .08* .02 .07* .11*** .11*** .01 .22*** .10** .18***
9. Education .20*** .25*** .12*** .28*** .25*** .01 .03 .15*** .19***
10. Property .09** .08* .08* .05 .05 .05 .01 .07 .12***
Notes. More positive values for each variable have the following meaning: Vote (leave); Immigration concerns (too high); Trust (higher); Threat (higher); Identity
(higher); Left–Right political orientation (right); Gender (female); Age (older); Education (higher); Property (greater ownership).










through the first mediator, the second mediator, and serially. In practical steps, the first
main effect is specified as the independent variable and the second main effect and
interaction term are entered as covariates along with the five control covariates. The
control covariates – political orientation, gender, age, education level, and home
ownership – were included on the basis of their correlations with threat and
identification. Our model specified that the interactive effect of immigration concerns
and political trust should operate indirectly first via threat and then via European
identification, to predict voting intention (see Figure 2). The syntax described in Hayes
(2015) generates a further data matrix from which the confidence intervals for the
moderated mediation are derived.
Kent
The overall model significantly predicted voting intention, N = 782, Nagelkerke
R2 = .585, 2LL = 629.91, Model LL = 450.97, p < .0001. Three of the covariates also
had significant effects. These were political orientation (b = 0.33, SE = .07, Z = 4.69,









































































Figure 1. Interactive effect of political trust and immigration concerns on European identification,
perceived threats, and intention to vote to leave the European union.
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0.05]), and home ownership (b = 0.47, SE = .21, Z = 2.29, p = .022, 95% CI [0.88,
0.07]). Respondents who were more right wing, older and less likely to own their own
home were more likely to vote to leave.
An inspection of the model revealed significant total indirect effects of the interaction
term (b = 0.09, SE = .047, 95% CI [0.19, 0.01]), and a non-significant direct effect
(b = 0.04, SE = .09, Z = 0.48, p = .63, 95% CI [0.14, 0.23]). There was a significant
indirect effect of the interaction via threat (b = 0.07, SE = .03, 95% CI [0.13, 0.03])
and a significant sequential mediation through threat and then European identification
(b = 0.06, SE = .02, 95%CI [0.10,0.03]). Themediation solely through theproximal
mediator (identification) was not significant (b = 0.04, SE = .02, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09]).
Contrasts also showed that the latter indirect effect was smaller than the indirect path
solely through threat (contrast coefficient = .11, SE = .03, 95% CI [0.18, 0.05]) or
sequentially through threat and then identification (contrast coefficient = .10,
SE = .03, 95% CI [0.16, 0.05]).
Scotland
The overallmodel significantly predicted voting intention,N = 731,NagelkerkeR2 = .52,
2LL = 618.47,Model LL = 357.34, p < .0001. Reduction inNwas owing tomissing data
on home ownership. As this had been a significant covariate in the Kent sample, it was
decided to retain this covariate in the Scotland sample, although in fact none of the
covariates had significant effects, and results were the same when this covariate was
excluded. An inspection of the model revealed significant total indirect effects
(b = 0.17, SE = .04, 95% CI [0.25, 0.08]) and a significant direct effect (b = 0.28,
SE = .09, Z = 3.26, p = .001, 95% CI [0.11, 0.45]). There was a significant indirect effect
of the interaction via threat (b = 0.04, SE = .02, 95% CI [0.09, 0.01]) and a







































Serial Indirect Effect = –0.05, 95%CI  [–0.09, –0.03]
Serial Indirect Effect = –0.06, 95%CI  [–0.10,–0.03]
Figure 2. Serial indirect effect of aversion amplification on voting intention in Kent and in Scotland
(***p < .001).
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(b = 0.05, SE = .02, 95% CI [0.09, 0.03]). The mediation solely through the
proximal mediator (identification) was also significant (b = 0.07, SE = .03, 95% CI
[0.13, 0.01]). The size of these three indirect paths did not differ significantly.
Reverse mediation tests
Across samples, we checked the plausibility of the reverse mediation sequence, namely
that aversion amplification first affected European identification and then threat (thus
treating threat as the proximal predictor of voting intention). In Kent, this reverse
sequential mediation was non-significant (b = 0.01, SE = .01, 95% CI [0.02, 0.01]). In
Scotland, the reverse sequential mediation was significant (b = 0.01, SE = .005, 95% CI
[0.02, 0.002]). However, the coefficient for the indirect effect via only European
identification (0.12) was significantly larger than that via both identification then threat
(0.01) (contrast coefficient = 0.11, SE = .03, 95% CI [0.18, 0.05]) and via only
threat (0.03) (contrast coefficient = .09, SE = .04, 95%CI [0.17,0.02]). Therefore,
the evidence is more consistent with the idea that European identification is likely to be a
most proximal mediator.
Discussion
The evidence for this study provides a unique insight into the social psychology of Brexit
in two key regions of the United Kingdom, Kent and Scotland. The two surveys were
conducted shortly prior to the actual referendum, so we are reassured that they were
adequately representative of opinion. Indeed, the patterns of voting intentionswere quite
consistentwith the actual referendum results. Given that the ‘Leave’ votewon by only 4%,
evenquite small influences on votingwere extremely important.Weused the data to test a
conceptual model explaining individuals’ propensity to vote to leave. Results supported
the model in these two distinct parts of the United Kingdom. The two data sets therefore
provide conceptual replications, which highlight the robustness of these findings. At the
same time, they offer interesting empirical comparisons.
We proposed that concerns about whether immigration levels are too high may be
more likely to generate symbolic, economic, and realistic forms of immigration threat and
disidentificationwith Europe under certain conditions. This argument is based on the idea
that prejudice and acts of exclusion can have a variety of roots, ranging from personal
discontent and mistrust (malign antipathy), to rivalrous forms of cohesion when
intergroup divisions are more salient (Abrams & Vasiljevic, 2014; Hosking, 2014). The
referendum may have stimulated both states and thereby stimulated rejection of the EU.
Political commentators have focused on two explanations for the success of the Leave
campaign. One explanation is about perceptions of immigration being out of control. The
second emphasizes the breakdown in political trust and consequent rise in populism. For
example, support for Brexit was stronger in those areas of the country which felt left
behind by the political establishment, or that historically repudiated the main parties and
politicians in Westminster (Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017). Based on recent
theorizing (Arndt, 2015; Eder et al., 2015), we contended that trust should act as a
moderator variable. Our aversion amplification hypothesis contended that when these
two factors combined they would catalyse aversion to the EU. Specifically, we proposed
that belief that immigration levels were too high in combination with mistrust of UK
politicians would amplify perceived threat from immigration and weaken European
identification, thereby mobilizing intentions to vote to leave the European Union – a
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combination of exit from the status quo but expressing political voice to gain control over
the change (cf. Arndt, 2015; see also Travaglino, 2017).
Our choice of context for this researchwas important.Whereas the Leave campaign and
its ‘maverick’ political figureheads in such as Nigel Farage (leader of UKIP) and Boris
Johnson (recent Mayor of London) gained particularly strong support in Kent, they were
much lesswell regarded in Scotland, a region dominatedmore strongly by left-wing politics
and with little affinity to London-based political figures. The Leave campaign as a whole
peddled highly questionable speculations about the benefits of leaving the EUand sought to
cast doubt on the veracity of contrary evidence provided by ‘experts’ (predominantly
academics and experienced economists – see Mance, 2016). The campaignmay even have
deliberately adopted a strategy ofweakening political trust (cf. Levi & Stoker, 2000;Mishler
& Rose, 2001), undermining the faith people had in the UK government. Such messages
clearly had some appeal in both regions in the present study. In Kent, the trust message
chimed well with constant news stories about illegal immigrants and asylum seekers and
criticism that the governmentwas not acting sufficiently to dealwith these. In Scotland, the
trust messages clearly reinforced perceptions that the Westminster (UK) parliament was
not really interested in or concerned with the interests of Scotland. Lower political trust in
turn implies that individuals should devise ways to protect their own interests
autonomously (Citrin & Muste, 1999). Yet we argued, and found, that the aversion
amplification process should be observed similarly in both of these contexts, providing
important comparative support for the hypothesis (cf. Eder et al., 2015).
We proposed that aversion amplification would affect voting intentions indirectly via
two mediators, threat and identification. We also expected that social identity would be
the more proximal mediator between perceptions of social reality (such as deprivation or
injustice) and political separatism (Grant et al., 2017; Randsley de Moura et al., 2009).
Results supported these hypotheses and indicated that threat was greatest and
identification lowest among respondents who were concerned that immigration levels
were too high and who had low levels of trust in politicians. The data are also consistent
with the idea that people’s feelings of threat also indirectly affected voting intentions by
reducing their identification with Europe.
Strengths and limitations
Among the limitations of the present research are the inevitable sacrifice of measurement
precision that goes with time and cost constraints of conducting large surveys with the
general population. Ideally, we would have used more items for each of the constructs
measured in this study to provide more reliable measures and parameter estimates.
However, the measures were based on prior research and the relationships found were
consistent with previous theory. None of the relationships were so high as to suggest
problems of multicollinearity. A different limitation is the specific operationalization of
constructs. For example, ourmeasure of concern referred to immigration generally rather
than immigration specifically from the EU. This level ofmeasurementwas chosen because
the Leave campaign generally focussed on all immigration levels (such as a poster showing
queues of Syrian refugees) and argued that leaving the EUwould enable better control by
removing all immigrants’ indirect access via EU countries.
Although our measures of immigration threat were based directly on prior social
psychological research, there is rather less consensus or consistency in the use of trust
measures in political science research (see extensive analysis by Eder et al., 2015), and
therefore, we must acknowledge that different types and foci of trust will need to be
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explored in future research. In particular, it may seem paradoxical that those who
expressed lower trust in UK politicians were most willing to remove power from EU
politicians, which might indirectly give more power to UK politicians. However, we note
that voting to Leave would give the voter more direct influence over the proximal
representative in two ways. One was that because most members of parliament were in
favour of a Remain position, voting Leave would directly challenge their preference. The
secondwas that leaving the EUwould remove an external influence or constraint (from the
EU) on UK politicians’ actions, making them more directly accountable to UK citizens.
Therefore, voting to Leave was perhaps not so inconsistent withmistrust in UK politicians.
The large samples used in this research offered advantages of greater generalizability
and external validity. The data therefore enabled us to test theoretically specified
relationships between variables to predict highly consequential voting intentions in the
British EU referendum. The evidencemakes a unique contribution to public and scientific
debates by providing an empirical test of two different accounts of individuals’ intentions
to vote leave or remain. Future research should extend this work by investigating
individuals’ voting behaviour using other methodologies and approaches, such as
experiments or longitudinalmethods.We note, however, that while experiments can test
theplausibility of causal relationships among variables, they are not a viablemethod in real
elections because it is neither ethical nor legal for scientists to experimentally manipulate
people’s voting intentions in such contexts. Nonetheless, simulation studies may shed
further light on potential causal roles of different variables and more work needs to be
done using the full range of different methods available.
Importantly, evidence about the relationships between demographic and covariate
measures and the focal analysis variables helps to allay concerns that we are observing
spurious relationships. For example, in both samples, consistent with contemporaneous
opinion poll data (see Clarke et al., 2017) and political commentary, older age, lower
education level, and political conservatismwere significantly correlatedwith intention to
vote to leave. Yet we observed equally strong or stronger relationships between voting
intention and political trust, concern with immigration levels, and the theoretically
specified mediators of threat and identification.
The moderated serial mediation tests in both regions supported a model in which the
interactive effects of political trust and immigration concerns operated indirectly through
their effects on threat and identification. However, we could not completely rule out the
possibility that these mediators might be independently relevant rather than necessarily
following the sequence that we specified. This seems reasonable given that their strength
could be affected by other contemporaneous factors (e.g., terrorism or sport competi-
tions). Therefore, we conclude that both threat and identification are likely mediators of
the aversion amplification effect, but that they may well be conduits of other influences
too. In Scotland, although the data were more consistent with our hypothesized
mediation sequence, we could not completely rule out a reversed sequence in which
identification precedes threat. However, considering both samples, we believe the
proposed sequence is more parsimonious.
Conclusions
The present research is the first to investigate systematically and empirically the
psychological processes arising from two explanations of why people voted to leave the
EU in the 2016 UK referendum. The evidence provides initial support for an aversion
amplification hypothesis. In the present research, this hypothesis was that intentions to
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vote leave would be fuelled when threat and lowered superordinate group identification
were amplified because immigration numbers were seen as too high and political trust
was low. Stated in more general terms the aversion amplification hypothesis makes a
theoretical contribution by articulating the implications of particular forms of the
relationship between threat and trust. It suggests that psychological resistance to
outgroup members (in the present case, immigrants) is amplified when they are seen as
posing a problem that the system cannot be trusted to resolve. Psychological resistance is
then likely to be expressed through a range of behavioural intentions or actions.
The aversion amplification hypothesis can be translated to other settings. Future
research can test howwell it accounts for support for non-establishment politicians such
as Donald Trump in the recent US Presidential election. It could also help to explainwhen
and why people engage in disruptive political action (Jost et al., 2012), or when they
adopt a social change ideology (Grant et al., 2017). Intriguingly, aversion amplification
seems to capture a state of ‘malign antipathy’ (Abrams & Vasiljevic, 2014). Such state
might be potentially volatile, finding its voice particularly when an opportunity arises to
kick out at the system, but being otherwise relatively dormant and non-systematic in its
impacts. For some people, opportunities such as the UK’s European referendummay act
as lightning rods for such antipathy.
We hope that the present work will stimulate new research in a variety of different
contexts. For example, in principle, the rhetoric of ‘taking back control’ may be one that
also describes some non-political contexts, such as when prisoners collectively riot; or
citizens stage sit-ins. The amplification hypothesis also hints at the effect of threat can be
shaped by other contextual factors. Specifically, it could be amplified by the release of
social constraints (absence of normative controls) or other factors. But it could be
attenuated if there are more or stronger constraints in place. Attenuating factors might
include individual differences in people’s willingness to hold or express prejudices
(Kunstman, Plant, Zielaskowski, & LaCosse, 2013); positive contact with immigrants
(Meleady, Seger, & Vermue, 2017), their desire to uphold certain values behaviourally
(Abrams et al., 2015), or other normative beliefs (Scheidegger & Staerkle, 2011), or the
presence of restrictive laws or regimes (e.g., in Egypt, Turkey or the Soviet Union). These
are all interesting avenues for future research.
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